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THE DECLARATION As UR-CONSTITUTION:
THE BIZARRE JURISPRUDENTIAL PHILOSOPHY
OF PROFESSOR HARRY V. JAFFA
by
PATRICK M. O'NEIL*
In his most recent work, Original Intent and the Framers of the Consti-
tution: A Disputed Question,' Professor Harry V. Jaffa finally has put
together in one place the core of his constitutional hermeneutic with all the
attendant elements of his jurisprudential philosophy.
Stated in oversimplified terms, perhaps, Dr. Jaffa sees the Declaration
of Independence as the source of the principles embodied in the Constitution
of the United States and finds the Declaration, furthermore, to be an indispens-
able aid to the correct interpretation of that later document.2
In order to comprehend the error of Jaffa's claims, one must first con-
sider several key questions.
THE DECLARATION AS LAW
Central to Harry Jaffa's constitutional hermeneutic is the notion that
the Declaration is law, and more specifically, that the Declaration is part of
the Organic law of the United States. Lewis E. Lehrman in his introduction
to the Jaffa volume, "On Jaffa, Lincoln, Marshall, and Original Intent," is
quick to present the standard Jaffa argument concerning the status of the
Declaration: ".... the Declaration is placed at the head of the statutes-at-large
* Patrick M. O'Neil is assistant professor of the humanities and social sciences at Broome
Community College (Binghamton, NY), teaching philosophy, history, and political science.
He holds a Ph.D. and an M.A., in British history from the State University of New York at
Binghamton, from which he holds a B.A. & M.A. in English Literature, and an M.A. in
Philosophy. He has published numerous articles in academic journals and reference works.
The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable assistance of Dr. Paul Finkelman,
Associate Professor of Constitutional Law at Virginia Polytechnical Institute and State
University at Blacksburg, whose unfailing patience and unequaled scholarship were of
invaluable assistance to the author in the revision and improvement of this article.
1. HARRY V. JAFFA, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION: A
DISPUTED QUESTION (1994).
2. This point is a recurrent one with Jaffa. See HARRY V. JAFFA, How To THINK ABOUT
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, passim (1978); Harry V. Jaffa, The Emancipation Proclamation,
in 100 YEARS OF EMANCIPATION, 1, 1-24 (Robert A. Goldwin ed., 1964); HARRY V. JAFFA,
CRISIS OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE ISSUES IN THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS
DEBATES 308-29 (1959); HARRY V. JAFFA, What is Equality? The Declaration of Independence
Revisited, in THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 149, 149-60
(1975); HARRY V. JAFFA, Another Look at the Declaration, in AMERICAN CONSERVATISM
AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 18, 18-25 (1984).
1
O'Neil: The Declaration As Ur-Constitution
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1995
AKRON LAW REVIEW
of the United States Code, and is described as one of the 'organic' laws of
the United States." 3
Why argue from the judgments of the editors of the U.S. Code, however?
The Declaration is part of our Organic Law because of what it does, not
because of where it has been placed by a bureaucrat/editor. It declared the
United States to be independent of Great Britain and able to do all which
independent states may do.4 Unlike colonies whose separations from the
Empire were done in a more regular and less violent manner, we do not
trace our independence to the British recognition of the same in the Treaty of
Paris (1783).
Must we not ask ourselves, however, what part of the Declaration is truly
law? As the legal scholar Dennis J. Mahoney noted, "The Declaration of
Independence may carry little weight in the courts; it may, for all its being
placed at the head of the Statutes at Large and described in the United States
Code as part of the 'Organic Law,' have no legally binding force."5
Let us look at the Constitution of the United States first. Consider the
Preamble 6 to that document:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common
defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty
to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution
for the United States of America.
How sweeping its phrases, how noble its rhetoric, how inspiring its cadences
are. As law, however, the Preamble is without effect. True law commands,
or it defines pertinent to commands. Could the Supreme Court set aside a law
of Congress because it did not, in the Court's judgment, "promote the general
Welfare" or "insure domestic Tranquility"?
Let us look back at the Declaration of Independence. It was intended,
apart from its simple, single legal purpose, to inspire support for the Revolu-
tion at home and to attract practical aid for it from abroad-especially from
amongst the Princes of Europe.
The fine Jeffersonian rhetoric with its careful enunciation of Lockean
3. LEWIS E. LEHRMAN, On Jaffa, Lincoln, Marshall, and Original Intent, in ORIGINAL INTENT
AND THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION: A DISPUTED QUESTION 3, 4-5 (1994).
4. For different views of the role of the Declaration, see WALTER BERNS, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY (1987); and WILLMOORE KENDALL & GEORGE W. CAREY, THE
BASIC SYMBOLS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION (1970).
5. Dennis J. Mahoney, Declaration of Independence, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION, 545, 545-46 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986).
6. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
[Vol. 28:2
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natural law principles to justify the break with Great Britain served the prac-
tical end of rallying support, but would also serve the high moral purpose of
avoiding the giving of scandal, in the phrase of the ethicians.7 When Jefferson
states that "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they
should declare the causes which impel them to the separation," he was mak-
ing the moral point that were America to have revolted without demons-
trating the moral justification of its cause that would have been to have
encouraged other revolts which might not have had justification under the
moral law.
Laws often have prefatory statements prefixed to them, but no necessary
logical relationship exists between the facts and values asserted in any
preamble and the contents of the law it introduces. Let us consider direct
mendacity first. Imagine a farm price support bill which every person with
minimal economic literacy would recognize at once as having the effect of
raising commodity prices (say, on milk). Now suppose that the congressmen
drafting this legislation preface it with a statement that to insure lower milk
prices Congress now institutes the price support system mandated herein.
The blatant contradiction between the expressed purpose of the law as
proclaimed by its introductory section and the clear effect which its imple-
mentation may be expected to have in the real world in no way affects the law
as law. It has not compromised or contradicted its principles. Its principles
are to be found in its mandates, not in the pious verbiage affixed thereunto.
The Declaration of Independence is at once a legal document, an histori-
cal document, and a political document. In the Declaration as a political and
as an historical document, the congruency of the reasons presented by
Jefferson for the revolt and the real causes of the revolt matter, but as a legal
document -even an organic legal document-nothing of any import flows
from the accuracy of the prefatory statements. Consider the charge against
King George III, "[f]or protecting the [British troops] by a mock trial, from
punishment, for any murders which they should commit on the inhabitants of
these States." Many would find the trial of the redcoats in the so-called Bos-
ton Massacre case to have been quite fair and the outcome to have been
perfectly reasonable, for example, John Adams and Josiah Quincy, Jr., who
defended the soldiers in their court trials. 8
Suppose, then, that this charge and many others (or, indeed, all others)
against the Hanoverian monarch had proven untrue, that in no way would have
affected the truly legal portion of the Declaration which, though stated in the
7. For the traditional view of scandal in moral philosophy and moral theology, see THOMAS
J. HIGGINS, MAN As MAN: THE SCIENCE AND ART OF ETHICS 338-340 (1992).
8. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 116-
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indicative mood, is, in fact, a command: From this point forward, the United
States shall be considered independent, etc. To cite an example of its effect,
in law cases where the common law is at issue, decisions of English courts
prior to July 4, 1776, are taken as binding legal precedent, while those from
that date onward are held to be only learned commentary.9
Given that the legal portion of the Declaration is a disguised imperative,
it could have no logical relation to the factual assertions which precede it.'"
Imperatives are not and cannot ever be true or false.1 They command, and
that is all.
If the truth of the bill of particulars against George III is irrelevant to
the logical effect of the Declaration, how much more so the Lockean philo-
sophical propositions? If, per arguendo, all men are not created equal and are
not endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, would the United
States revert to colonial status in the now barely extant British Empire?
THE AUTHORITY OF THE DECLARATION
In the process of the adoption of the Constitution of the United States the
most elaborate care was exercised to insure legitimacy to the new governmen-
tal order. Under Article VII of the Constitution, the Constitution would take
effect in the ratifying states when nine states had ratified, and ratification was
to be by ratifying conventions in each state.
By the device of popularly elected ratifying conventions, the Framers
sought to insure that ratification would be an act by the people, not merely an
intergovernmental agreement with ratification accomplished by state legisla-
tures, as had been the case with the Articles of Confederation.12
In fact, however, the action of state legislatures was also required for the
permissive legislation enabling the elections for the conventions and the
conventions themselves to take place. This, in effect, made the Constitution's
ratification a joint act by both the legislatures and by the ratifying conventions
together. In addition, although Article VII ignored the Congress of the
Articles of Confederation out of strategic considerations, the Congress did
in fact "report out" the Constitution with the recommendation that state
legislatures act to set up elections for convention delegates in order to decide
the question of adoption.
17 n.24 (1967).
9. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 111-15 (2d ed. 1985).
10. For the imperative theory of law, see C.L. HAMBLIN, IMPERATIVES 18-20 (1987).
11. W. WARD FEARNSIDE, ABOUT THINKING 72-74 (1980).
12. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION of 1787 92-93 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
[Vol. 28:2
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It is quite true, of course, that the adoption of the Constitution was ille-
gal under the Articles of Confederation, because the Articles required,
amongst other things, the unanimous consent of the states to any amendment
of the Articles, and the Constitution could be seen to constitute an amendment
in toto of the Articles. As things ultimately turned out, of course, the Con-
stitution did receive ratification by all thirteen states, but potentially, the
method of ratification prescribed in Article VII implied the secession of the
nine from the thirteen. At the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia,
James Madison dealt with the question of the violation of the rules for amend-
ment of the Articles. His answer was simple and direct: The Articles had not
been true Organic Law because under them sovereignty had continued to
reside in the states individually. The Articles, therefore, were a kind of elabo-
rate treaty of alliance between nations. 3 If the Articles were a treaty, were
they not binding; and since they spoke of a "perpetual union", were they not
binding in perpetuity?
Madison proposed a double defense for the abrogation of the "treaty" of
the Articles. First, of course, there is no perpetuity in the international law of
treaties. 4 Under the principle of rebus sic statibus, a treaty may be set aside
when it no longer serves the purposes for which it was created due to changed
circumstances. 5 Also, if one party to a treaty has seriously violated it, any
other party (or parties) to the pact may declare it a nullity if they so wish.16
The Articles of Confederation had been violated by all parties - and violated
repeatedly. 7
The Articles of Confederation, as has been mentioned above, were
ratified by the thirteen state legislatures. What, however, was the mode of
adoption of the Declaration of Independence? It was approved by the Con-
tinental Congress - a thoroughly ad-hoc body - operating on behalf of the
thirteen states which had or which would give up their colonial allegiance to
the Crown. Prior and posterior acts of state legislatures affirmed the legal
claim of independence dating to the Declaration of July 4, 1776, and
ultimately, the governments of the Articles and of the Constitution looked
back and, in effect, reaffirmed the Declaration's claims of independence.
From what authority, however, did the Declaration derive its alleged right to
13. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION of 1787 314-15 (Max Farrand ed.,
1966).
14. GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 505 (4th ed. 1981).
15. Id. at 507-509.
16. Id. at 507.
17. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION of 1787, supra note 12, at 315-16; THE
FEDERALIST No. 43, at 279-80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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act as ur-Constitution - as legally defining the character of all subsequent
American governments?
Locke would say that when government legally dissolves-as it did
in the Glorious Revolution -then the legislative power devolves upon the
people (for it can never be destroyed unless civil society itself ceases).18 In
what way, however, may the rhetorical flourishes of Jefferson be seen as an
act of the people corporately? Independence was undoubtedly an act of the
people, but the high-blown rhetoric in the document of its proclamation - the
Declaration of Independence - cannot, seemingly, claim that status.
The members of the Continental Congress assembled at Independence
Hall in Philadelphia on July 4, 1776, were delegates from state legislatures,
unelected by the people and having no commission to ratify an Organic Instru-
ment, and no subsequent act of the Continental Congress nor of the legisla-
tures would seem to qualify for such an extraordinary act.
Who authorized the Continental congressmen so to act, and in the
absence of such an authorization, how may the Declaration be said to do other
than it claims on its surface to do - declare independence?
Ironically, it is the very frailty of the Declaration's position which allows
it best to serve Professor Jaffa's philosophical legerdemain. The seeming
unamendability of the Declaration comes from the fact that the Continental
Congress was a disembodied ad-hoc legislature which went out of existence
with the adoption of the Articles of Confederation, and was placed further
at a distance historically by the adoption of the U.S. Constitution as our
Organic Law.
To the extent that Jaffa sees particular provisions of the Constitution,
such as the three-fifths clause,19 the fugitive slave clause,2" and the reserva-
tions on the prohibition of the slave trade 21 as contrary to the principles of the
Declaration, it is unclear why their adoption should not be regarded as a
repeal of the appropriate section of the Declaration. [Most scholars would not
think this way, of course, but that is because most scholars would see the
Declaration as law only in regard to its declaring of independence.]
The American people are a fully self-governing people, and as such, they
possess the power to alter any of their Organic Law 22, including the Declara-
18. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 118 (Buffalo, Prometheus
1986).
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
20. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1; U.S. Const. art. V.
22. The restrictions upon the power of amendment contained in the Fifth Article of the
Constitution are merely procedural variants. If an individual state were to be deprived of its
[Vol. 28:2
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tion. Should they decide to do so, Americans can fully revise the Declaration,
undoing even their political independence. Unlikely though it might be in the
event, America could resume its colonial status in the British Empire by a
three-fold legal strategy -a treaty with the United Kingdom, appropriate
enabling legislation, and an appropriate constitutional amendment.
If the proposition that "All men are created equal" were part of the legal
contents of the Declaration (which I find difficult to imagine or understand),
then why does the adoption of the three-fifths clause, the fugitive slave clause,
and the temporary protection of the international slave trade in the Constitu-
tion not repeal that portion of the Declaration which they contradicted. That
is the normal effect of contradictory legislation, whether statutory, treaty, or
Organic - the last act of the sovereign will is decisive.
Another clear problem in this regard for Dr. Jaffa's theory of the
Declaration is his own citation of the Northwest Ordinance as part of the
Organic Law of the United States. In lectures delivered in the early 1980S,23
Dr. Jaffa emphasized that the Organic Law section of the U.S. Code contains
the Declaration of Independence, the Northwest Ordinance, and the Consti-
tution of the United States. The inclusion of the Northwest Ordinance in the
Organic Law emphasizes the differences to be found in the various parts of
the Organic Law.
The Articles of Confederation, which was part of our Organic Law, and
the Constitution, which is the core of that law, have elaborate procedural
requirements for their own amendment. It was not so with the Northwest
Ordinance. Although part of our Organic Law by virtue of the nature and
importance of its subject matter, the Ordinance was a legislative enactment of
the Congress of the Articles. As such, it was effectively repealed by the adop-
tion of the U.S. Constitution. Note the precise Phraseology of the Constitu-
tion in Article VI, clause 2: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land .. "
Pre-existing treaties of the United States were left in force by the Con-
equal suffrage in the Senate, that state would have to be one of the ratifiers of the amendment,
and abolition of the Senate would require unanimous ratification by the states. See JOHN R.
VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 156-
82 (1992) (detailing the historical arguments about implicit limitations on the power of the
amending process); and JOHN R. VILE, CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS SURROUNDING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS 127-54 (1993) (exploring and critiquing claims by
contemporary scholars to have discovered substantive limitations on the amending power in
Article V).
23. Harry V. Jaffa, Lectures delivered at the Intercollegiate Studies Institute Western
Summer School at Claremont McKenna College (1980 & 1981).
Fall/Winter 1995]
7
O'Neil: The Declaration As Ur-Constitution
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1995
AKRON LAW REVIEW
stitution, as was the public debt,24 but the confederal laws passed under the
Confederation ceased to have the force of law. The new Congress, convened
under the authority of the Constitution of the United States, moved almost at
once to re-enact the Northwest Ordinance, which has remained law ever since.
The Northwest Ordinance is a solemn compact between the United
States and the inhabitants of its territories promising statehood upon the
achievement of sufficient population and political stability. Nobody famil-
iar with the standards of legal interpretation, however, could mistake that
pledge as legally binding - it is a moral promise - but no future Congress can
actually be bound in law to grant statehood to any particular territory, no
matter what conditions prevail within it.
In addition, tomorrow Congress could pass an act invalidating the North-
west Ordinance, and upon the new act's taking effect, the Northwest
Ordinance would be repealed. Its status as Organic Law does not prevent
this. The Articles of Confederation required and the Constitution requires
special procedures for amendment or repeal (i.e., amendment in toto) on
account of their methods of adoption and on account of their own internal
rules for amendment. If the Declaration of Independence could be passed by
a simple act of the Continental Congress, why could an act of the U.S.
Congress - a more regular and representative a legislative body than its pre-
decessors - not repeal the Declaration (if that were what the act purported to
do)? By the same token, an enactment of Congress which violated some part
of the Declaration would seem by that very contradiction to invalidate that
portion of the Declaration which its content contradicted.
Perhaps, however, we may conclude that Dr. Jaffa has another reason for
the unamendability of the Declaration, another reason for its special status as
ur-constitution .25
THE DECLARATION AS NATURAL LAW
To the extent that the Declaration truly expresses the natural law, and it
is at most a replication of the Lockean version of the same, it might be held
to be immune to alteration by majorities, or even super-majorities. Such a
stand, however, confuses natural law doctrine and conflates the positive law
with the natural law.26
24. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 1.
25. By the term "ur-constitution", this article means to convey a legal document which is
at once the most basic and perduring enactment of the Organic Law of the nation, which also
(somehow) takes on as well the aspects of the political philosophers' social contract and the
instantiation of the natural law as it relates to the political order.
26. See Patrick M. O'Neil, Etharchism - The Birth of a Political Heresy in Hedley Arke's
[Vol. 28:2
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Of course, it goes without saying that the natural law cannot be altered
or amended by any political process whatsoever. However, this is simply
not true of the natural law as it may be embodied in the positive law. If the
Declaration proclaims the true principles of the natural law, that does not
prevent alteration of the Declaration to exclude or even to contradict those
true principles. Let us assume, contrary to historical fact, that a year after the
adoption of the Declaration, the Continental Congress voted to delete the
phrase "All men are created equal. . ." from the Declaration. Let us assume
further that they indulge a racist bent and substitute the phrase, "all white men
are created equal," or even more offensively, "No Negro is equal to a white
man in law or in natural right."
Dr. Jaffa and this author would both be opposed to such an amendment
on the grounds that it violated natural law and instituted (in essence) a false
statement. Where Jaffa would, I believe, disagree with this author would
be in the fact that he would see the Declaration as somehow unamendable.
If the Declaration proclaims the true principles of natural law, Jaffa would
maintain nobody has the right to alter it. That is true on the moral level,
of course, but this cannot be translated into a ban on such alteration in posi-
tive law.
If the American people may not repudiate the principle of equality or
the principle that "just authority comes from the consent of the governed"
that is because these principles are part of the natural law, not because they
are enshrined in the Declaration. Equality-to the extent that equality is part
of the natural law-remains part of the natural law whether later install-
ments of the Organic Law contradict it or not. The inclusion of provisions
in the Constitution contradictory to equality must be seen as repealing the
commitment to equality which the Declaration enacted into law (if such
it did). Adopting provisions in the Constitution which contradict the
Declaration's principles does not compromise those principles, it repeals them
as matters of law.
The way that the Declaration can continue to be seen as articulating
principles for the Republic is for these principles to be seen as traditional
principles, as well as moral one (but not legal ones) -which is probably what
was meant by Madison, Lincoln, and others when they evoked the Declara-
tion.
Beyond the Constitution, 85 SOC. JUST. REV. 182-85 (Nov./Dec. 1994). Arising from an
examination of HEDLEY ARKES, BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION (1990) (this article critiques
"etharchism" (coined term) which conflates the spheres of the positive law and the moral law
in a way quite alien to orthodox natural law thinking, wherein the interrelationship of law and
morality does not obliterate the independence and integrity of the domain of the positive
law).
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Traditional principles, unlike legal ones, are not revoked by the enact-
ing of contrary pieces of legislation. In many cases, their status as traditional
principles are actually strengthened by their contradiction by the positive law,
for traditional principles are often confirmed in opposition to official
deviations as much as in the compliance of rules and laws to these principles.
Why does Professor Jaffa seem to need legal status for the principles of
natural law embodied in the Declaration? Why does he not find the more
common status of traditional values to be sufficient for his purposes?
NATURAL LAW AS POSITIVE LAW-A STRAUSSIAN GAMBIT
By making the natural law a part of the positive law, Jaffa seems to hope
to strengthen the relationship between these two types of law, but that simply
cannot be done. The positive law may be shaped and informed by the natu-
ral law, but it always remains a separate sphere of law.
Much of the sphere of positive law involves extrinsic rules which are not
directly mandated by the natural law. According to the natural law view,
extrinsic law may not contradict the intrinsic principles of natural law; the
rules it establishes must serve purposes which ultimately would be embraced
by intrinsic morality, and the principle of obedience to just authority, which
is the basis of the extrinsic, is itself a principle of intrinsic morality.
Much of Organic Law turns out to be extrinsic in nature, of course. Right
to trial by jury, right to legal counsel, freedom from double jeopardy, right
to a speedy trial, requirement of indictment by a grand jury, immunity from
compulsory self-incrimination, etc. can none of them be absolutely required
by natural law, but are part of a legal artifice designed to insure a fair trial. A
different set of safeguards might theoretically suffice just as well.
When challenged with the extrinsic nature of most of our constitutional
safeguards, Dr. Jaffa has often retreated to a citation of the bans on ex post
facto legislation 27 as an example of the intrinsic nature of at least some of our
constitutional protections. 28 In fact, however, all retrospective legislation
cannot be regarded as inherently unjust, as was demonstrated by this author
in a recent publication.2 9 Ex postfacto law which punishes morally neutral
action which has subsequently been criminalized by legislation based
on extrinsic morality is, of course, inherently unjust, for at the time of the
27. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; and U.S. CONST. art. I. § 10, cl. 1.
28. Harry V. Jaffa, Lectures delivered at the Intercollegiate Studies Institute Western
Summer School at Claremont McKenna College (1980 & 1981).
29. Patrick M. O'Neil, Retroactivity and Justice in Law: Some Reflections on Ex Post
Facto Legislation, 7 Free Life: J. Libertarian Alliance 20, 20-23 (No. 1, 1992) (Published in
the U.K.).
[Vol. 28:2
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commission of the "crime" there has been no promulgation of the law with
the result that the "perpetrator" could not know that his action was to be for-
bidden. In the case of a violation of intrinsic morality with serious antisocial
implications, however, the punishment of such action by retrospective legis-
lation would not necessarily be unjust.
If one imagines a regime which legalizes mass murder of its opponents
before committing genocide, one would not see a subsequent regimes punish-
ment of such atrocities as unjustified. The U.S. Constitution contains a total
ban on such legislation on account of the prudential judgment that the dangers
of the misuse of the power to create such legislation exceeds the dangers of
the potential exoneration of serious antisocial malefactors.
Even when the positive law seems to recapitulates the natural law, they
still remain separate spheres. When human law forbids murder, for example,
it is still imposing the degrees and punishments of murder by the will of the
legislator. Natural law may set the upper limits of punishments, but in gen-
eral, the range of punishments is open to choice.
Furthermore, to discover that a thing is contrary to the natural law is not
to discover whether it is to be outlawed or not, for as St. Thomas observed,30
not every vice is to be proscribed by law, but only those which are contrary
to the nature of society-e.g., murder, theft, fraud. The lawgiver must draw
that delicate line between public and private vice, which line may legitimately
vary between cultures and societies.
In Jaffa' s view of the history of American law, the enactment of the
Declaration bound U.S. law to the natural law in a very unique way. The
Declaration specifically endorses the natural law, in the Jaffa view, and on
that account natural law is binding in constitutional and statutory interpreta-
tions by the courts.
On the one side, this is extraordinarily convenient for Jaffa, since he
fears (as a good Straussian) the entanglement of revealed religion in natural
law jurisprudence. Invocation of St. Thomas, or even Maimonides, always
carried the danger of doctrinal pollution of the pure springs of natural law,
which is why Jaffa always advocated the use of Aristotle in preference to the
use of his medieval followers. 3 By having the natural law enacted as a part
of the organic positive law, Jaffa seeks to relieve himself of the problem of the
metaphysical basis of the natural law, with its religious underpinnings.
30. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1-11, Q. 96, art. 2, reprinted in THE
POLITICAL IDEAS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS (D. Bigonglari ed., 1953).
31. For Jaffa's preference for Aristotle over St. Thomas Aquinas, see HARRY V. JAFFA,
THOMISM AND ARISTOTELIANISM: A STUDY OF THE COMMENTARY BY THOMAS AQUINAS ON
THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS (1952).
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The enunciation of general principles of natural law in the positive law
cannot make them more obligatory in conscience for the citizen than they are
already. To the extent that these principles are truly natural law principles,
they are automatically binding in conscience. To the extent that they contra-
dict the natural law, the positive law cannot make them binding.
What if the natural law principles of the Declaration act as interpretative
guides to the Constitution-which is at least part of Jaffa's claim? If the posi-
tive law of the Constitution would contradict the principles of the Declaration
by authorizing and protecting slavery, it is unclear how such principles could
be invoked to prevent any other institution which the Constitution could be
interpreted to allow. Let us examine this last possibility in the context of Dred
Scott32 and the issue of slavery in the territories.
DRED SCOTT AND THE GOVERNANCE OF THE TERRITORIES
A central issue upon which Jaffa tests his constitutional hermeneutic
based on the Declaration as the true repository of the original intent of the
Framers of the Constitution is that raised by the Dred Scott case, and specifi-
cally by Chief Justice Taney' s opinion. This opinion figures large in Jaffa' s
thought, and he uses it as a battering ram against what he regards as the
insufficient originalism of former Attorney General Edward Meese:
"Unfortunately for Mr. Meese's argument, no one, on or off the Court, has
ever expounded the theory of original intent with greater eloquence or con-
viction than Chief Justice Taney in the case of Dred Scott."33
Of all of the Jaffa arguments, this is doubtlessly the strangest. Taney's
search for "original intent" involved the presentation of numerous historical
falsehoods (whether presented deliberately or through carelessness) as well
as abstruse and distorted theory which on its surface must appear prepos-
terous.
In Jaffa's misunderstanding of the Taney opinion in the Dred Scott
decision,34 he is scarcely unique, for that decision is possibly the most mis-
understood in all American judicial history. To Jaffa, as to most commenta-
tors, the heart of the decision rests in the denial of effective legal personhood
to Blacks. Jaffa expresses it thus: "Taney decided that Dred Scott, as a mem-
ber of an inferior and dependent race (inferior and dependent, that is, by the
32. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
33. HARRY V. JAFFA, What Were the "Original Intentions" of the Framers of the
Constitution of the U.S.?, in ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION: A
DISPUTED QUESTION 13 (1994).
34. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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law of the Constitution) was not and could not become a citizen of the United
States." 35
This reason was one of the two rationes decidendi of the Dred Scott
decision .36 Normally, an opinion is held to have only one ratio decidendi -
the one key point upon which the logic of the decision turns. Dred Scott had
two rationes decidendi, however, because the case had two independent
conclusions .3 7 On the one hand, Dred Scott did not have the right to have
brought the suit (in Taney's opinion), and thus he is labeled as "plaintiff in
error"-the case being heard as a plea in abatement. Some scholars have
raised the issue of the appropriateness of Taney's examination of other issues
in the case given the status of the plea in abatement.38
This article will maintain that the examination of other issues was
procedurally appropriate since the dismissal of the case due to the denial of
citizenship status to Dred Scott would not have hindered the refiling of the
identical case by the federal attorney for the district in which Dred Scott was
held in Missouri or by the Attorney General. The United States would be the
plaintiff, and its standing as plaintiff would arise from its interest in freeing
the slave in vindication of its ban on slavery in some of the territories; all
other aspects of the case would be similar.
The right of the federal government to sue for emancipation of slaves
brought into areas where they were prohibited was well established in the
Antelope case , 39 which involved a pirate/slaver caught in U.S. territorial wa-
ters. Certain complications arose in the Antelope case, but the right of the
federal government to seek the emancipation of slaves brought into the coun-
try through the illegal slave trade was never in doubt.
The second ratio decidendi, therefore, had to deal with the substantive
issue of the case apart from the question of the ability of Dred Scott to have
brought the action in federal court.40 The second and substantive question of
the case involved the existence of a municipal authority over the territories
possessed by the federal government. Jaffa tends to see this simply as the
power of the federal government to ban slavery from the territories, but it is
important in posing the existence of this power to understand how and in what
35. JAFFA, supra note 26, at 14.
36. See generally Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (1978).
39. The Antelope, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 546 (1827); see also JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE
ANTELOPE: THE ORDEAL OF THE RECAPTURED AFRICANS IN THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF JAMES
MONROE AND JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 323-326 (1990).
40. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393.
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way it is claimed.
The U.S. Constitution states in part: "The Congress shall have Power to
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Terri-
tory or other Property belonging to the United States. .. ."I' Taney denied the
clear meaning of the text as well as all legislative practice, and to achieve this
deception, he had to distort prior legal precedent.
Banning a form of property in one geographical area does not deprive
owners of that form of property of their rights provided only that their prop-
erty is located outside of the proscribed area or that they are permitted
to remove the property from the forbidden area or that they are compensated
for emancipations which occur in pursuance of that law.
Perhaps one could maintain that the absolute value of one's property is
diminished if one cannot take that property with one into a particular territory,
but that is not the same thing as an absolute depredation of one's property
right, and all regulation whatsoever involves such diminishment of the
property right.
The right of the federal government to forbid slavery in the territories
rested upon the federal government's possessing municipal authority for the
territories. Taney had first to deal with the above quoted section of the Con-
stitution. This he did by claiming that the constitutionally granted power of
the territories was only to sell or grant land to settlers etc. Congress had no
right, in Taney's view, to make any law whatsoever for the territories.42
The first difficulty Taney then had to face was the Northwest Ordinance
which was passed just before the Constitutional Convention by the Congress
of the Articles and then re-enacted by the First Congress convened under the
Constitution. The Northwest Ordinance forbade slavery, clearly indicating
that many of the members of the Congress of the Articles and of the First
Congress under the Constitution (many of whom were at the Constitutional
Convention) thought Congress had that power. Taney attempted to escape
this gambit by claiming that Congress's right to forbid slavery in the North-
41. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
42. However the Supreme Court rejected Taney's view of an absence of federal municipal
authority over the territories in a wide variety of cases. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States
98 U.S. 145 (1878) and Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S.
1 (1890). In what have become known as the Insular Cases, i.e., DeLima v. Bidwell, 182
U.S. 1 (1901), Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901), and Downes v. Bidwell, 182
U.S. 244 (1901), the Supreme Court began to establish an elaborate theory of territorial
governance including doctrines of incorporated and unincorporated territories and of organized
and unorganized territories. In Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm'rs v. Ynchausti & Co., 251 U.S. 401
(1920), the unanimous court accepted the doctrine of the incorporation of territories, and by
1922, a unanimous court would apply it as settled law in Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298
(1922). See also THE AMERICAN TERRITORIAL SYSTEM (John Porter Bloom ed., 1973); and
[Vol. 28:2
14
Akron Law Review, Vol. 28 [1995], Iss. 2, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol28/iss2/4
THE DECLARATION As UR-CONSTITUTION
west Territory came from the grant of the State of Virginia which ceded her
claim to this area under the condition that slavery not be allowed to exist
therein. In carrying out the prohibition of slavery, the federal government was
only carrying out the conditions of the cession, which were within the munici-
pal authority of the state, according to Taney.
The ownership of the Northwest Territory by Virginia (and particularly
the ownership of all of that territory) was challenged by other states, many of
which made their own cessions. This does introduce the problem of how the
Virginia cession could be determinative unless it were to be determined that
Virginia had, in fact, been the true owner.
The next problem for Taney was an existing Supreme Court decision
which Taney cited, American Insurance Company v. Canter.4 3 Canter had
been awarded ownership of the recovered cotton in a Florida Territorial
Salvage Court at Key West. The insurers of the cargo involved, the Ameri-
can Insurance Company and the Oceanic Insurance Company appealed
the salvage court ruling, ultimately to the Supreme Court under Chief
Justice Marshall.44
The claim of the appellant to reverse the original judgment for Canter
rested in the alleged unconstitutionality of the Florida Territorial Salvage
Court. All federal judges, according to the Third Article of the United States
Constitution, are to be nominated by the President, to be approved by the
Senate, and are to enjoy a life tenure. Judges of the Florida Territorial Salvage
Court were nominated by the territorial governor, were approved by the
territorial legislature, and were to enjoy fifteen-year terms. Chief Justice
Marshall upheld the original decision, dismissing the claim of unconstitution-
ality in the composition of the salvage court, and his justification lay in the
fact that this court was created under the municipal authority of the federal
government in the territory, not by the federal government qua federal
government. In itself, therefore, Canter affirmed the municipal authority of
the federal government in the territories. Taney deliberately misinterpreted
Canter, claiming that it dealt with Article III and had no relevance to the
issue contested in Dred Scott.
Canter was, of course, central to Dred Scott because its bold assertion
of a municipal authority in the territories exercised by the federal government
settled the right of Congress to forbid, or to allow slavery in whatsoever
territories it saw fit. For Taney, then, one final, enormous problem remained.
Arnold H. Liebowitz, United States Federalism: The States and The Territories, 28 AM. U.
L. REV. 449 (1979).
43. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 393; citing American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.)
511 (1828).
44. See generally 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511.
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Having denied a federal municipal authority for the territories, there was no
source of lawgiving for the territories. This Taney attempted to solve by an
extraterritoriality by which each person entering the territories was under the
laws of the state from which he had come.
Apart from the legal chaos that such a system would produce in practice,
there seems no source for this extraordinary notion, except, perhaps, in a
distorted reading of the Northwest Ordinance. When the federal governance
of the Northwest Territory was first envisioned, a problem arose in that the
governor had, for practical reasons, to be given the right to make laws by
decree. In order to avoid tyranny, however, a proviso was placed upon the
power of rule by decree. The governor was restricted to enacting laws which
already existed on the statute books of some state. Needless to say, this is not
truly the extraterritoriality envisioned by Taney, but merely a restraint upon
the right to legislate by decree.
To call Taney's decision in Dred Scott an exercise in interpretation by
a hermeneutic of original intent, as Jaffa does, in simply perverse. Taney may
claim to be guided by original intent, but, in fact, he was attempting to solve
the political issue of slavery in the territory by judicialfiat disguised as
constitutional scholarship or adjudication.
The doctrine of the Declaration as ur-constitution, which Professor Jaffa
has promulgated for years does not provide one with a consistent constitu-
tional hermeneutic, but actually creates more philosophical difficulties than
it solves. From the point of view of legal scholarship, the Declaration as the
meaning of the Constitution is almost incomprehensible.
The greatest pity in this regard is that Jaffa is not completely wrong.
Many of the Framers hoped that the people would use the mechanisms of the
Constitution to preserve the ideals of the Declaration both in their roles as
public officials and in their roles as members of an enlightened electorate.
They did not, however, envision the Declaration as an ur-constitution in the
keeping of a priestcraft of judicial activists.
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